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Protest campaigns are occurring more frequently around the world. Between 2006 and 2013, 
there were a total of 843 protests in all regions of the world and across all national income levels.  While 
there were 59 reported protest events in 2006, there were 160 in 2012 and 111 alone in the first six 
months of 2013.1  This upsurge in world-wide protests is an important reason why peace studies 
scholars have started paying closer attention to them, especially when these events have the potential 
to bring down regimes and escalate into full scale civil war.2  Regardless of their outcomes, protest 
campaigns provide us with rich information about the escalation and de-escalation dynamics of political 
conflicts.  Protests often increase or decrease in intensity during their lifetimes even if they do not bring 
down regimes or transition to armed conflicts.    
This study examines the interactive dynamics between the Turkish government and the 
protesters during the Gezi Protest Campaign in 2013 to explain the escalation and de-escalation phases.  
The campaign escalated quickly by generating massive support from different segments of Turkish 
society in its early days, and then de-escalated and eventually demobilized without securing major 
concessions.  I use the Gezi campaign to shed light on how tactical interactions between the protesters 
and the government, the timing and types of government responses, and different types of protest 
tactics determine the escalation and de-escalation processes.  Moreover, by using original data collected 
from a Turkish daily newspaper, Cumhuriyet, I illustrate how the trajectory of the Gezi campaign 
changed in response to the interactive dynamics between the government and dissidents.  
 My objectives in this article are twofold.  First, I show how and why escalation/de-escalation 
processes are influenced by government repressive strategies.  In particular, I argue that the tactics, 
timing and targeting of state responses as well as tactical adaptation and innovation in government-
dissident interactions are important factors that influence protest dynamics.  Second, through a detailed 
examination of the Turkish government’s strategies to respond to the Gezi protesters’ tactics, I highlight 
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the interactive dynamics of protest campaigns, a topic which has not attracted much scholarly attention 
among civil resistance scholars in International Relations.3  
In the next section, I define the phenomenon of protest campaigns and explain the centrality of 
treating them as a unit of analysis for studying escalation/de-escalation processes.  In the subsequent 
section, I theorize and illustrate how and why government repressive strategies and tactical interactions 
between governments and dissidents influenced escalation/de-escalation processes during the Gezi 
campaign.  In the conclusion, I draw out the theoretical implications associated with the connections 
between repressive strategies and escalation/de-escalation processes. 
 
Definition of Protest Campaigns 
In social movement research, a protest campaign is a “sustained, organized public effort making 
collective claims on targeted authorities.”4  It always links at least three parties: a group of self-
designated claimants acting on behalf of a constituency, some target of their claim-making (usually 
governmental authorities), and a general public.  A protest campaign grows out of a single protest event 
and evolves into a broader set of protest events.  In peace studies research, protest campaigns are 
referred to as civil resistance campaigns.5  A civil resistance campaign reflects a series of observable, 
continuous nonviolent tactics by dissidents in pursuit of a political objective.  Such a campaign can last 
anywhere from days to years.  It has a discernible leadership and is often identified by a name with 
relatively clear beginning and ending points.6  Both the social movement and peace studies definitions 




Escalation and De-escalation Processes in Protest Campaigns 
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In nonviolent resistance research, the approach to studying protest campaigns has generated 
important empirical findings that have centered on two major themes: short and long term outcomes of 
protest campaigns and tactical shifts from nonviolence to violence.7  Short term outcomes are 
associated with the success or failure to bring about regime change in this research program.  Key 
factors that affect success are participation size, military defections, the breakdown of nonviolent 
discipline, movement fragmentation, and tactical diversity.8  Long term outcomes of protest campaigns 
are linked to greater or lesser democracy.  Nonviolent strategies of protest are more likely to lead to 
democratic transitions, while violent strategies are more likely to lead to greater autocratization.9  
Regarding the second focus – tactical shifts from nonviolence to violence in protest campaigns, 
important causal explanations have centered on state repression, military crackdowns and the absence 
of promised political reforms.10   
Yet, rarely have we seen studies of protest campaigns that focus on the escalation and de-
escalation processes of political contention.  As sociologists have long stated, the escalation process 
occurs as dissidents mobilize their supporters in ever growing numbers of nonviolent protest 
demonstrations, while the de-escalation process typifies the situation where dissidents, their supporters 
and their participation in demonstrations wanes and eventually ends.  Hence, protest campaigns have a 
life cycle of expanding and contracting political contention.11  How and why these patterns of expansion 
and contraction occur is an important phenomenon that remains understudied. 
Perhaps the most difficult challenge to studying protests is that they are complex processes that 
are characterized by dynamics, endogeneity, and spontaneity.  Dynamics means that political contention 
changes through time and space. 12  Endogeneity signifies that the escalation and de-escalation of 
contention are the result of the interdependent interactions of multiple actors (states, challengers, third 
parties and bystanders).13  Finally, spontaneity refers to events or happenings that were not planned, 
intended, or organized in advance.  Due to the dynamic, endogenous, and spontaneous characteristics 
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of protest campaigns, identifying generalizable patterns and causal relationships has been difficult.14  For 
example, the diversity of regime types, economic conditions, the strength of the militaries, or the 
religious composition of the Middle Eastern regimes that were challenged by mass uprisings makes it 
hard for us to understand why only a few of them led to regime change while many protests were 
successfully demobilized.  
What is, however, common in every protest campaign is that every single one has phases of 
escalation and de-escalation, which are the generated by the interactive relationships between state 
actors and dissidents.  Their actions combine together sequentially and simultaneously to produce 
processes of escalation and de-escalation.15  If we can observe how “specific repertories and practices of 
protest” interact with and lead to specific government responses (and vice versa) in waves of escalation 
or de-escalation,16 we might get a better idea as to when and how these processes are triggered.  
Therefore, rather than focusing on structural conditions that predict protests and their outcomes, 
investigating the actions and reactions of state actors and dissidents might give us better leverage in 
terms of identifying common patterns among protest campaigns.  
 
State Repressive Strategies during Protest Campaigns 
Studying escalation and de-escalation as an interactive process requires us to examine the 
actions of dissidents, state actors, and their responses to each other.  When dissidents first take to the 
streets to voice their grievances, governments respond one way or another.  How governments respond 
to dissidents during protest campaigns is central to understanding the dynamics of escalation and de-
escalation.  In particular, governments often have a full arsenal of repressive measures that can be 
utilized to demobilize protesters, but we have little empirical and nuanced evidence to explain why 
some governments are more successful at it than others.  We know little about when and why 
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governments repress at different levels and in combination with other strategies that include 
accommodation.   
Yet, much of the empirical evidence on tactics in civil resistance research has focused heavily on 
dissident behavior at the expense of studying the variety of tactics that state actors employ against 
dissidents which, in turn, influences their behavior.  For instance, scholars have investigated why 
nonviolent dissidents are likely to achieve their political objectives rather than their violent 
counterparts,17 why the discipline of nonviolence breaks down into violence,18 and why dissidents who 
pursue a diverse array of tactics are likely to be more successful than those who rely on a narrower set 
of devices.19  These findings are indeed important.  However, this one-sided approach to dissident 
behavior overlooks the dyadic relationship between state-dissident interactions.  Not only do dissidents 
deploy a range of tactics but so do states in their efforts to demobilize protesters.  In turn, dissident 
tactical behavior is influenced heavily by the counter-measures that state actors employ.  Therefore, in 
order to understand nonviolent tactics, we should also pay attention to the possible differential effects 
that certain types of repressive strategies are likely to have on dissident tactics.  For instance, policing 
strategies can escalate protests while, at other times, they can deter protesters from taking to the 
streets. 
I argue that governments pursue intermittent strategies of demobilization that evolve over time 
as leaders learn which ones are effective (or ineffective) through trial and error. 20  Demirel-Pegg and 
Rasler have identified five basic strategies governments typically use to respond to mass protests:  
accommodation, counter-mobilization, policing, targeted arrests, and crackdowns.21  Accommodation 
refers to government concessions that range from negotiations to symbolic reforms to deeper serious 
reforms that may even involve regime change.  A counter-mobilization strategy reflects efforts by state 
actors to initiate the mobilization of opposition groups that are threatened by or adversely affected by 
protesters’ political demands.  Although this is a subtle tactic,22 it has the potential to delegitimize 
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protesters by demonstrating to bystanders that a significant proportion of the public does not share 
their political goals.  A policing strategy is reactive repression, an effort to suppress protests as they are 
occurring.23  Its tactics typically involve the cordoning off of areas from protesters, using teargas, rubber 
bullets or water cannons for dispersal, as well as curfews and arresting and/or beating protesters.  
Targeted arrests refer to the state’s efforts to target activists in order to weaken the resilience of 
protesters, their organizations and networks.  The state identifies activists and arrests them by raiding 
their homes or work places.  This tactic also includes the termination of government employees’ 
positions.  It is implemented outside of protest sites and, therefore, is different from onsite arrest.  A 
crackdown strategy involves the use of lethal force by firing at protesters, killing them indiscriminately 
or conducting siege operations against wide swaths of urban territory or executing activists, their 
families and neighbors indiscriminately.24  The significance of the crackdown strategy is that the 
coercion is disproportionate to the actions of the protesters.25   
State actors do not necessarily deploy all these five strategies at the same time or even 
sequentially.  Likewise, dissidents will rely on a range of actions that can be deployed strategically and in 
response to state policies: demonstrations, boycotts, sit-ins, strikes, blockades or occupation and even 
violence.  This endogeneity requires us to look at the full array of tactics that both actors utilize during 
these campaigns.  Seeing how state and dissident actions intersect gives us a better picture about how 
and why certain state repressive tactics, as well as the timing of these tactics, accelerate, sustain, 
contain or decelerate dissident mobilization.  I argue below that tactical adaptation and learning are 
crucial mechanisms for understanding these effects. 
 
How tactical adaptation and learning affect escalation and de-escalation processes  
 Since escalation and de-escalation processes are central to protest campaigns, we must pay 
particular attention to tactical adaptation and how it drives the direction, intensity and outcomes of 
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protest campaigns.26  By tactical adaptation, I rely on McAdam’s understanding that it emerges out of a 
“chess-like” interaction based on the efforts of governments and dissidents to offset the moves of the 
other.  Specifically, governments adopt counter-measures designed to neutralize protest mobilization.  
In turn, dissidents shift their tactics in response to these counter-measures.  How well each side learns 
to adopt innovative measures and counter-measures will influence the escalation as well as the de-
escalation process in protest campaigns.  If dissidents are able to adapt by innovating new tactics of 
collective action that governments are unable to respond to, they are better positioned to sustain their 
movement, expand it to more participants and allies, and gain bargaining leverage over the government.  
If, however, governments are able to adjust their repressive tactics vis-à-vis dissident actions 
successfully, they are better situated to disperse and eventually demobilize dissidents and their 
supporters, especially if dissident organizations are weak or factionalized.27  
 What little empirical evidence that strategic nonviolence studies have produced on tactical 
adaptation relies heavily on the “substitution” mechanism: how and when dissidents shift (or substitute) 
from nonviolent tactics to violent ones.   The “substitution” mechanism, as advanced by Lichbach rests 
on the premise that as the government represses a dissident tactic, thereby raising the costs of that 
tactic, dissidents will switch to an alternative tactic.  The presumption is that governments motivate 
dissidents to shift to violent tactics by increasing the costs of non-violence through repression and vice 
versa.  28  However, past studies on these mechanisms have relied heavily on whether and how much 
repression affects protest activity in a one-step sequential process, as opposed to identifying how 
repression shifts dissident tactics and how dissident tactics shape government responses over multiple 
sequences (and vice versa) in an interactive way.29  Moreover, theorizing about the substitution 
mechanism rests mostly on understanding how repression drives the tactical shifts from nonviolence to 
violence as opposed to how various types of repressive strategies influence the change in dissident 
tactics across an array of nonviolent tactics.  For instance, if we look at the Egyptian January 2011 
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uprising that brought down the Mubarak regime, dissidents started out using marches, rallies and 
demonstrations, but shortly thereafter, they shifted their efforts to include the occupation of public 
squares such as Tahrir Square, and then by the end of the campaign, dissidents engaged in civic and 
working class strikes that brought the government and the economy to a standstill.  There was a distinct 
evolutionary process over the course of this short campaign, which involved the shifting from one type 
of nonviolent tactic to another, instead of from nonviolence to violence.  When and why Egyptian 
protesters used different nonviolent strategies is an interesting empirical question.  How and whether 
state repressive strategies influence these dynamic shifts is something that strategic nonviolence studies 
have yet to pursue systematically.30   
Finally, since tactical adaptation between state and dissident actors is central to processes of 
escalation and de-escalation in protest campaigns, it has the potential to contribute to our 
understanding about why some protest campaigns escalate and evolve into full scale civil war.  Such a 
dynamic occurred in Kashmir as the non-violent protest waves in the mid-1980s evolved to an 
insurgency in 1988.31  Reactionary governmental repression of nonviolence subsequently led to more 
violent protests, producing a spiraling of conflict as the number of deaths multiplied.  Meanwhile, 
external military support in the forms of arms and training encouraged Kashmiri dissidents to increase 
their use of violence, which in turn redoubled the Indian state’s use of repression.  The spiraling conflict 
between these actors would ultimately evolve into a full scale insurgency.32  This pattern of state-
dissident interactions reinforces Tarrow’s argument that separating lesser forms of contention from civil 
wars is likely to mask significant escalatory processes.33 
 
The Dynamics of Escalation and De-escalation during Gezi Protests (May – August 2013) 
 The above discussion suggests that the types of strategies states use to respond to protests, the 
response of protesters to repression, and the timing of these interactions play a major role in 
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determining escalatory and de-escalatory processes.  I argue that looking at a full range of government 
and dissident tactics over the course of protest waves and tracing both sides’ tactical shifts and 
interactions will provide us with a more nuanced understanding of civil resistance than using aggregate 
measures of repression and protest only.  To illustrate my arguments, I examine the behaviors of the 
Turkish government and the protesters during the Gezi campaign in 2013 by using original events data 
collected from a national daily newspaper in Turkey.  The quantitative and qualitative analysis of this 
case shows that a disaggregated measure of state repressive strategies yields a deeper explanation for 
the de-escalation and the eventual demobilization of the campaign than relying on a single over-
aggregated measure of repression.  The analysis also demonstrates that state-dissident interactions 
evolved over the course of the campaign and reflected tactical adaptation and innovation by both 
parties.  These dynamic interactions were important factors that drove the direction, the intensity and 
the outcome of escalatory and de-escalatory processes of the protest campaign. 
 The 2013 Gezi protest campaign lasted 10 weeks with 2.5 to 3.5 million people participating in 
protests across 79 cities in Turkey.34  When the campaign ended, seven deaths, 8,000 injuries and 
approximately 5,000 arrests were reported.35  The initial protests began in reaction to the government’s 
attempt to replace Istanbul’s green space in Gezi Park with an urban development project, which 
included a multi-use complex modelled on a 19th century Ottoman barracks that would include 
residential units, a shopping mall, and a mosque.  Taksim Solidarity, a coalition of local activists, business 
groups, and environmentalists opposed this redevelopment project.36  Prime Minister Erdoğan moved 
forward with the construction on May 27. In response, protesters began a sit-in and occupied the park.  
As police entered the park, they used teargas to disperse the protesters and set fire to their tents.  
Protests quickly spread throughout parts of Istanbul and other cities as images of the heavy police 
response were broadcast across the nation particularly via social media.37  Thousands of demonstrators 
carried “ResistGezi” signs to demonstrate their solidarity with the protesters in Istanbul.  Although 
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Prime Minister Erdoğan’s reactions to protest movements against foreign governments during the Arab 
Spring had been supportive of democratic rights and freedoms,38 when facing domestic protests, he 
responded differently. Rather than an exercise of freedom of expression, Prime Minister Erdoğan 
perceived these demonstrations as a coup attempt and authorized a heavy-handed police response.39  In 
turn, the police response changed the scale and the scope of the campaign as demonstrators began to 
call for Mr. Erdoğan’s resignation.40 
 The Gezi campaign was exceptional in that its participants came from broad segments of the 
society – much broader than any previous protests in Turkey.41  A majority of the participants were in 
their 20s, with little affiliation to any political party and no prior protest experience.42  The government’s 
heavy-handed policing tactics inadvertently expanded and consolidated the protesters’ support base to 
include the educated middle class (students, businessmen, teachers, academics, doctors and lawyers) as 
well as working class groups who joined the campaign within a few weeks of the park protests.  In 
addition, a variety of social and ideological groups across the left-right spectrum as well as gays and 
lesbians, Kurds, nationalists and secular and religious Muslim groups also participated.43  In short, the 
Gezi resistance campaign reflected broad popular discontent against the decade-long rule of the Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) and Prime Minister Erdoğan.  This discontent centered on several issues: 
the growing Islamist conservative and authoritarian rule which threatened societal secularism,44 the 
increasing lack of press freedom,45 and the escalation of arrests and prosecutions of journalists, students 
and human rights activists for alleged terrorism.46  Moreover, for critics of AKP, the remodeling of Gezi 
Park was unacceptable because it symbolized AKP imprinting its political Islamic ideology on Taksim 
Square, which had been a symbol of cosmopolitanism and the leftist ideology for several decades.47 
I use original data collected from Cumhuriyet, 48 a national daily newspaper in Turkey to 
illustrate the interactive dynamics of the Gezi protest campaign.  The dataset covers both nonviolent 
and violent forms of protest (such as demonstrations, strikes, and clashes with the police) and 
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government responses (such as the use of teargas, imposition of bans, and arrests).  Events were coded 
for the date, actor, location, target, number of participants, number of injured and number of deaths.  In 
total, 1,416 events were hand coded based on a list of events found in Krain’s scale of repression, 
accommodation and dissent actions in post-revolutionary states and Moore and Lindstrom’s  Violent 
International Conflict Data Project.49  The data were aggregated in daily intervals to capture the rapidly 
evolving dynamics of the campaign.  
 
Tactics, Timing and Targeting of State Responses during the Gezi Protests 
During the Gezi campaign, the Turkish government relied heavily on policing and targeted arrest 
strategies, with little to no counter-mobilization, crackdown, or accommodation strategies.  Teargas, 
water cannons, pepper spray and plastic bullets were the main tools of policing.50  Targeted arrests 
involved a series of raids and police operations that resulted in the arrests and detainments of 
thousands of organizers and leading activists within the campaign, along with their immediate allies.  
 The plot of the total numbers of protests and repressive events is shown in Figure 1.  At first 
glance, this suggests that the levels of protests and repressive events follow parallel trajectories 
throughout the campaign.  Figure 1 also shows that during the first three weeks of the campaign, 
protests and repression moved closely together although the protest series is consistently higher than 
the repression series.  In the fourth week, around June 20, 2013, however, both protests and the 
repression series decline dramatically and they start to intersect as the frequency of protest and 
repressive events become more evenly matched.  If we relied solely on the levels of protest and 
repression, the data would indicate that when protests began and escalated rapidly within the first 
weeks of the campaign the government’s response was relatively restrained since the number of 
protests exceeded the number of repressive events.  In addition, the data suggests one of two possible 
interpretations: the government appeared to be successful in demobilizing the protest campaign at the 
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start of the fourth week as the number of protests declined significantly, or the protest campaign could 
not sustain itself for reasons only partly related to the repression.  The historical record suggests that 
the latter explanation is indeed important.  Activists were unable to build an organizational 
infrastructure that could unite diverse protesters around a unifying set of political objectives.51  
Therefore, one would conclude from both the data and the historical narrative that the policing strategy 
and dissident organizational weakness were key explanations for the de-escalation and decline of the 
protest campaign. 
/ Figure 1 here / 
 Nonetheless, the story becomes more nuanced when we disaggregate repression into specific 
government strategies as depicted in Figure 2.  In this graph, the decline in the levels of protest events 
coincides with a switch in the government’s repressive strategy which would have been overlooked if 
we had stayed with an aggregated variable of repression.  Instead, the disaggregated repression data in 
Figure 2 show that the government pursued a combination of policing and targeted arrest strategies – a 
shift from the previous strategy of policing alone which failed to curtail the protests.  Targeted arrests 
appear to be responsible for the demobilization of the protest campaign as demonstrated by the 
significant de-escalation of protests by the fifth week of the campaign.  In short, the government 
pursued a policing strategy during the first few weeks of the campaign which was associated with an 
escalation of protests, indicating a backlash effect against the brutal tactics of policing.52  Nonetheless, 
once the government started to implement the targeted arrest strategy, protests declined.  
The historical narratives during this period also support this interpretation.  As the images of 
police brutality in the Gezi park protest diffused to the rest of the country through social media, the 
protests expanded rapidly in Istanbul and other cities.53  Despite confronting teargas, water cannons and 
plastic bullets, people poured into the city streets making broader demands for human rights, 
democracy and the end of the authoritarian policies of the AKP government.54  The Gezi Park 
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confrontation inadvertently led to the coalescence of a wide range of groups that cut across social and 
ideological strata.  At the end of the first week of protests in Gezi Park, more than 100,000 people 
demonstrated in Ankara on June 1, 2013.55  This was followed by a nationwide strike as workers, civil 
servants, architects, engineers, doctors, and dentists joined the protesters in the streets.56  
/ Figure 2 here / 
Beyond documenting the government’s ineffective policing strategy at the start of the protest 
campaign, Figure 2 also shows that the government’s shift to arresting and detaining activists and 
leaders of the protest campaign appears to have been successful in choking off the protests during the 
second half of the ten-week campaign.  The data demonstrate that starting on June 18, 2013, the 
beginning of the fourth week of the campaign, the level of protests dropped considerably and never 
recovered. For instance, the average number of all protest events was 211 for the first three weeks, but 
by the fourth week, that number dropped to 75 events (a 64% decline) and, in the subsequent weeks, 
the protest events gradually declined each week.  The historical narrative again reinforces the evidence. 
Beginning on June 18, 2013, the government conducted four major waves of arrests throughout the 
country.  The first wave started on June 18th and concentrated on activists located in Istanbul and 
Ankara.57  The next major wave of arrests and detentions happened on July 5th as the government 
continued to target activists and student dorms in cities across Turkey.  The third wave of arrests 
transpired during the week of July 8-15, 2013, as activists in the major cities of western Turkey were 
targeted.  Meanwhile, the government also arrested 48 members of Taksim Solidarity Platform, an 
umbrella group of dissidents that were initially behind the Gezi Protest. 58  Finally, the last wave of 
arrests occurred on July 22 with 20 more arrests in Ankara.59  Over the course of these operations, the 
government targeted not just activists but also their networks of support, including their attorneys and 
medical personnel who treated their injuries.  Journalists were especially targeted, 81 of whom were 
fired or forced to resign over the course of the protest campaign.60 
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The disaggregated repression data show that the Turkish government pursued not one but two 
strategies, one of which (the policing strategy) generated a backfire effect and the second of which was 
successful in demobilizing the protesters.  It was the second strategy – targeted arrests – that changed 
the dynamics of the protest campaign.  While still pursuing policing tactics at protest sites, the 
government introduced massive police operations that arrested key activists and protesters in the major 
urban areas of the country.  The shift from the single strategy of policing to a dual strategy of policing 
and targeted arrests made it possible for the government both to evacuate the occupied spaces in the 
parks and squares and detain activists before they could recruit new participants.61  The strategy of 
targeted arrests was especially effective in compressing the time frame, allowing activists little time to 
overcome their organizational deficits.   
Moreover, disaggregating repression data also highlights the important role of timing in the 
effectiveness of different repressive strategies.  The Turkish government’s use of the policing strategy 
early in the campaign was not only ineffective in deterring protesters from taking to the streets, but it 
also contributed to the escalation of protests by motivating people who were outraged by the images of 
police brutality to participate.  However, after the government implemented the targeted arrests 
strategy, the escalatory effect of the policing strategy vanished. Even though the police continued to 
respond to nonviolent demonstrations with excessive force, protests did not escalate at this stage of the 
campaign.  In sum, this disaggregated approach to repression provides a more nuanced understanding 
about how the timing and type of repressive strategies affects dissident behavior. 
 
Tactical Adaptation and Learning between Dissidents and the State 
In addition to tactics, timing, and targeting of repressive strategies, tactical adaptation and 
learning also influence whether states are able to demobilize dissenters or whether dissenters are able 
to outwit state actors by sustaining, escalating and even expanding their protests with new participants.  
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A central dynamic that shapes the patterns of contention in protest campaigns is the “iterative, trial-
and-error character” of actions and counter-actions among internal groups.  Actors will shift toward 
tactics that were successful in past interactive sequences and away from those that failed.62  The Turkish 
government shifted from a policing to a tactical arrest strategy as a response to the spread of 
demonstrations across Turkey – a clear example of strategic adaptation.  So, the question is how did 
dissidents respond to this strategy?  The analysis below shows that protesters attempted to innovate at 
about the same time the Turkish government switched to a combination of a targeted arrests and 
policing strategy.  However, massive arrests and harsh policing tactics were able to blunt the spread of 
these tactics.  The lack of organizational leadership and cohesion among the dissidents also aided the 
government’s effort to counteract these tactics. 
An examination of Figure 3 indicates that at the height of the protest campaign during the first 
three weeks, protesters relied on three main tactics: demonstrations, nonviolent disruptive actions 
(labor strikes, sit-ins and boycotts) and, to a much lesser extent, violence (primarily actions involving 
property damage).  All three of these tactics declined significantly as massive arrest operations were 
instituted.  At this point, dissidents shifted to more passive forms of nonviolence during the latter part 
of the campaign – the aggregate numbers of which are displayed in Figure 4.63  Shifting from their 
traditional repertoire of demonstrations, rock throwing, strikes and boycotts, dissidents opted mainly 
for two types of actions: “standing man” protests and open discussion forums.   
/ Figure 3 here / 
/ Figure 4 here / 
The “standing man” protests started with a young activist, Erdem Gündüz, who spontaneously 
stood quietly for nine hours near Gezi Park after the government’s brutal clearance of the area two days 
earlier on June 17, 2013.  Coverage of this action via Facebook and Twitter encouraged hundreds of 
activists to join him.64  In response, the government arrested 17 of the dissidents.  Within 24 hours, 
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inspired by Gündüz’ spontaneous innovation of a new tactic, thousands of protesters organized similar 
“standing man” protests across major urban areas of Turkey.65  There were even variations of these 
protests with activists either holding flowers, silently reading books or covering their mouths with duct 
tape to renounce the government’s restrictions on freedom of speech.66  In addition to the “standing 
man” protests, activists in Istanbul organized evening public discussion forums at local parks so that the 
public could express their political opinions.  For instance, Taksim Solidarity organized a forum in Maçka 
Park that attracted 400 participants.  In another city, Çorum, approximately 3,000 people gathered at a 
local park to make demands on the government.67  Unfortunately for the dissidents, the government’s 
massive arrests operations began during the same period and blunted the spread of their new tactics.  
Figure 4 shows that there is a short-lived upsurge in these new tactics from June 18 until June 25, 2013, 
but they taper off fairly quickly.  
Theoretically, activists can overcome repressive policies through tactical innovation.  Such 
strategic adaptation makes it possible for activists to expand dissident participation and sustain high 
levels of protests.68  But, the Gezi protest campaign shows that innovative tactics alone cannot 
substitute for an organizational infrastructure.69  In the initial stages of the campaign (during the first 
three weeks), the activists were successful in building momentum for confronting the Turkish 
government, largely as a result of the backfire effect. In this instance, activists were able to disseminate 
the evidence of police brutality and garner greater national support among protesters in other major 
cities. However, they were unsuccessful in maintaining that momentum largely as a result of the 
government’s massive arrest and detention operations.  Even in their efforts to shift to new tactics 
associated with “standing man protests” and “forums in public spaces,” activists were unable to sustain 
and expand public participation in such protests.  In this instance, the Turkish government was able to 
marginalize dissidents from the general population by removing their leaders and labeling them as 
subversives who were trying to undermine an Islamic-based government.70  In sum, the rapid escalation 
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of the protests and the participation of too many groups with competing political agendas impeded the 
formation of an alternative organization that could continue to challenge the government.  When 
protesters innovated their tactics to re-galvanize public support, their efforts also failed because without 
an organizational infrastructure, they were unable to unify and channel their actions into a sustained 
campaign.71  At the same time, the government’s ability to switch to an effective targeted arrest strategy 
hampered the activists’ capability to build an infrastructure, peel off support from the government and 
establish an effective counter-narrative for their own political platform.  
 The analysis of the Gezi protest campaign demonstrates that a disaggregated measure of state 
repression yields a nuanced explanation of how the campaign de-escalated in contrast to an over-
aggregated measure.  Tactical adaptation and learning occurred on both sides of the government-
dissident divide which reinforces the proposition that strategic decision-making during protest 
campaigns is “not a one-off process without history.”72  In other words, actors’ responses to each other’s 
actions affect each actor’s next move, creating a dynamic of its own.  Therefore tactical adaptation and 
learning are central underlying processes of both escalation and de-escalation and they should be 
studied dynamically.  In the Gezi case, the government had to switch to a strategy of targeted arrests 
because government elites learned that heavy-handed policing brought more people out on the streets 
instead of deterring them.  The activists also shifted to more passive tactics as conventional forms of 
protests such as marches and processions attracted violent police responses.  In the end, the 
government’s adaptation proved to be more successful as the targeted arrest strategy successfully 
demobilized the dissidents.  
 
Conclusion 
The dynamics of the Gezi campaign are a good illustration of how a state’s repressive strategies 
can increase dissident mobilization at one time while decreasing it at another.  The same story goes for 
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dissenters who employ a range of anti-government tactics – some of which will be successful in 
circumventing state repression while others will not.  This campaign also shows that central to the story 
of escalation and de-escalation is the role of tactical adaptation, learning and innovation.  State actors 
who learn and adapt quickly to their lack of success in demobilizing protesters are likely to manage and 
survive protest campaigns.  Dissidents, on the other hand, must also innovate in the face of state 
repressive policies in order to sustain and expand their participation base; otherwise, they will 
eventually be defeated.   
These dynamic interactions open up new questions for civil resistance research.  Namely, what 
types of repression and/or dissent do initiators and their targets use and when do they use them?  What 
are the consequences of these state-dissident interactions for escalation and/or de-escalation of the 
protest campaign itself?  The answers to these questions will significantly add to our understanding of 
how the repression-protest relationship drives the life cycle of protest campaigns.   
From a policy standpoint, the analysis sends a clear, yet unfortunate message to dissidents that 
consistent and strategically applied repression works.  Even if a government’s initial responses backfire 
and escalate protests, a successful outcome for the dissidents is not guaranteed.  Governments have a 
variety of different strategies available to them and by using them strategically they can still successfully 
demobilize protesters.  Continuously learning, adapting tactics, and investing resources to build 
organizational capacity and increase resilience are potential measures dissidents can take to counteract 
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